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I. Introduction 
One important difference between labor markets for women in developed 
and developing countries is the existence in the latter of a large so-called 
informal sector. This sector is characterized by jobs which can be carried 
out at or near the home, or are otherwise compatible with simultaneous 
child care. Examples of informal sector occupations include home crafts 
assuch as needlework and weaving, various services such cleaning and laundry, 
running small retail stores or market stands, street vending, and even some 
forms of light manufacturing. Twenty years ago Jaffe and Azumi (1960) noted 
that women employed in informal sector jobs (or cottage industry, as they 
called it) could work during pregnancy without difficulty, and could inter­
sperse work with taking care of young children. They hypothesized that the 
commonly observed lower fertility of working women compared to non-working 
women should not hold for women in informal sector jobs. This hypothesis 
was confirmed by their examination of data from Puerto Rico and Japan: 
women who worked for pay in the home had fertility similar to women who did 
not work; women who worked outside the home had lower fertility. Similar 
conclusions were reached by Weller (1968) in a further study of the Puerto 
Rican data, and Hass (1972) in a study of seven major Latin American cities. 
These studies based their empirical conclusions on simple correla­
tion or tabular analysis of two variables, fertility and female employment 
status, which are both more appropriately viewed as choice variables 
influenced by a common set of exogenous factors. McCabe and Rosenzweig 
(1976) built an explicit economic model of the factors affecting a house­
hold's choices concerning fertility, female labor force participation, and 
sector of work. Their regression analysis of the ubiquitous Puerto Rican 
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data revealed a result not usually found in studies of developed countries:
a positive effect of the market wage rate for women on fertility, as well 
as the usual positive effect on labor force participation. This result is 
consistent with the existence of informal sector jobs in which women may
work without sacrificing their child care time. A study by Smith (1978) using
a similar economic framework applied to data from Mexico City found that 
unanticipated increases in fertility (unplanned births) caused women to 
increase their labor supply if they worked in informal sector jobs but not 
if they worked in formal sector jobs, a finding also consistent with the 
c.h-ild care compatibility of informal sector jobs. 
Jaffe and Azumi drew a logical conclusion from their study: "From 
the population viewpoint, perhaps the most desirable industries to be 
introduced into an underdeveloped country would be those using large quanti­
ties of female labor away from home, in modern factories, stores, offices,
etc." [Jaffe and Azumi 1960, p. 62]. Rosenzweig and McCabe [1976, p. 347] 
discuss a similar policy prescription for reducing fertility in developing 
countries, although they are careful to point out some of its potential 
drawbacks. One issue not considered in these studies concerns the effect of
women switching from informal to formal sector occupations on the human 
capital of their children. Women in informal sector jobs may be able while 
working to engage in home production of ''child quality" or investments in 
the human capital of their children such as nutrition. Providing incentives 
for a woman to switch from informal to formal sector jobs may induce a decline
in fertility but also implies a withdrawal of part of her time input to the 
production of investments in her children's human capital. If enough of the 
increased income earned by a woman in a formal sector job is allocated to 
purchasing substitutes for the reduced time input by the woman in home pro-
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duction then the level of child human capital could be maintained or even 
increased. The effect on children's human capital depends upon the 
substitutability of other inputs for the woman's time, and the subjective 
substitutability of child quality and other home goods for child quantity 
in parents preference functions. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the determinants of 
fertility and home investments in the human capital of children in a 
context in which women have the option of working in the informal sector 
as well as the formal sector or no market work. The types of issues 
investigated include: (a) Does a woman who works a given number of 
hours for pay in the informal sector have childre~ with a higher level 
of human capital than they would have if she worked in the formal sector, 
other things equal? (b) How easily are households able to substitute 
other inputs to replace a woman's time in home production if she moves 
from the informal to the formal sector? (c) Does the choice of sector 
of employment respond to changes in the relative wage offers in the two 
sectors in the manner predicted by economic theory? (d) Does fertility 
respond differently to changes in informal sector wages than to changes 
in formal sector wages? 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II a 
simple household production model of fertility, child investment, and 
the informal-formal sector choice is proposed as a useful tool for 
analyzing these issues. Predictions of the mdel and its implications 
for the empirical work are discussed. The empirical analysis presented 
in Section Ill uses data from a 1977-78 survey of households in Nicaragua. 
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The nutritional status of young children is employed as a measure of human 
capital which is especially relevant given the potentially seYere effects of 
malnutrition and the evidence of widespread child malnutrition in developing 
1countries. The empirical analysis is carried out within the framework of 
the theoretical model and attempts to. test its predictions. Section IV 
discusses the conclusions of the study and some tentative implications for 
policy. 
II. The Household Production Model 
In this section a theoretical household production model of fertility, 
child nutrition, and the woman's sector of employment is developed. 2 The 
model is used to predict the effects of changes in key exogenous variables 
such as income, wages, and prices on these household decisions. To facilitate 
such predictions the model must of necessity be simple; it does not attempt 
to incorporate all of the possible channels through which nutrition may 
interact with fertility and women's work decisions. The realism that is 
lost through simplification allows development of a relatively tractable 
3model. 
The approach embodied in this model is static, with no uncertainty. 
All choices are assumed to be made at the beginning of the single period 
in full knowledge of preferences, endowments, home production technolo~y, 
and market constraints. The woman and her spouse or companion are viewed as 
a single decision-making unit with the utility of individual family members 
suppressed and only "family utility" considered. The couple is assumed to 
have preferences for the number of children surviving to age five, C, 
the average nutritional status of surviving children, N, which is the 
child quality or investment variable used here, and a composite market 
good, z. 
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The parents preferences are represented by a utility function 
(1)
U = U( C, N, Z) 
with positive and decreasing marginal utility for each good. In order 
to focus the analysis on C and Nit is assumed that UCZ • UNZ • 0, 
implying that a change in Z has no effect on the marginal rate of substitu­
tion between C and N. It is assumed that UCN > O. 
Average child nutritional status is nodeled as a good produced in 
the home with inputs of family members' time and purchased market goods. 
The home production function for N is 
N -= N (T, J, X, C; R) (2) 
where T • time spent by the woman in home production; J • time spent by the 
woman in informal sector work; X can index of purchases of market goods 
used in the production of N; and R represents the level of technical ef­
ficiency of production, assumed to be exogenous. A number of assumptions 
are being made in this formulation. First, the time of the husband and 
family members other than the wife are not inputs into the production 
of nutrition; their allocation of time is taken as exogenous. Second, 
it is assumed that the wife's time spent in informal sector work {J) is 
simultaneously an input to the production of child nutrition. This as­
sumption, which will be tested empirically, is consistent with the notion 
discussed above that it is generally possible to take care of one's 
children while engaged in informal sector work. Third, since N represents 
average child nutritional status C is included in the production function 
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as an input with a negative marginal product. Other things equal, ioore 
children mean fewer resources per child, and also lower marginal products 
for the other inputs (see Gopalan and Naidu 1972 for evidence on this 
point). The variable X includes food purchases as well as purchases of 
medical services, child care services, and other market goods relevant 
to children's nutritional status. It will often be referred to as food 
for brevity. The variable T represents breastfeeding time, cooking, 
shopping, and other uses of time which affect nutritional status, and 
will often be referred to as "home time." 
The assumptions regarding signs of derivatives of N(·) are that all 
first partial derivatives are positive except NC w
hich is negative; all 
second own partial derivatives are negative except Ncc , which
 is positive 
(the effect of an additional child on average nutritional status becomes 
less deleterious as C increases); and all cross partial derivatives are 
positive except those involving C, which are negative. 
It is assumed for simplicity that there are no biological constraints 
Childon fertility, so that desired family size can always be attained. 
mortality is ignored as well (until Section In),so the number of children 
It issurviving to age five simply equals the number of live births. 
fairly straightforward to drop these assumptions and expand the model to 
incorporate a fecundity constraint and a child mortality function (see Blau 
1980, Chapter 4), but this is not necessary for the purposes of this paper. 
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The time constraint faced by the family is 
(3)T+J+H•T 
where H. time spent by the woman in formal sector work, and Tis total time 
available to the woman after subtracting time spent in producing other home 
goods. The budget constraint is 
(4).J W + H w + E • p .X + pz • z• • I • F x 
wereh w1 an
d wF are wage rates for informal and formal sector work, 
respectively; Eis family income minus the woman's earnings; and 
Px and P2 are prices of X and Z, respectively. Let X be the numeraire 
and set Px c 1 so that w1 and wF are real wages in terms of food. 
Assume also that wF > w1 ; if not, formal sector work would never be 
taken as exogenous. This ignores the possibility that wages depend on 
accumulated human capital, as in Willis (1974), except in so far as this 
is captured by the fact that wF > w • Children's earnings, if any, are1 
subsumed in E and not explicitly analyzed since the focus here is on young 
children who do not yet face the work decision. The earnings of the 
spouse or companion are considered exogenous 
and the time of the companion is assumed not to contribute directly to 
production of child nutrition. Home food production is assumed away since 
the empirical work uses a sample of non-agricultural households. 
As formulated in equation (4) the budget constraint allows for the 
possibility that a woman can work in both the informal and the formal 
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sector simultaneously. However, if there are fixed money or time costs of 
working in any given job in either sector, then it is unlikely that a 
woman would find it in her interest to work simultaneously in more than one 
sector.
4 This possibility is therefore assumed away, implying that either 
H • 0 or J • 0 or H • J • O. The model can be analyzed separately for these 
three cases with the couple assumed to calculate its maximum utility given 
that the woman will (a) participate in the informal sector, (b) partic~pate 
in the formal sector, or (c) not participate in market work at all, and 
then choose the allocation of resources corresponding to the option yielding 
the highest utility. 
In the remainder of this section the necessary conditions for an 
optimal allocation of household resources are presented for case (a) as an 
example, and then comparative statics for all three cases are discussed. 
In the informal sector case the household maximizes the Lagrangean 
£ - U(C, N [T, T - T, X, C; R], Z) 
(5) 
where A is the lagrangean multiplier, H • O, (2) is substituted for N, 
and T - Tis substituted for J. Assuming interior solutions, t~e first 
order conditions for a maximum of £ are 
(6)
cl£ • U • N + U • 0N C CclC 
cl£ (7)
• U •(N - N) - A •V • 0cT N T J I 
9 
(8) 
0£ (9)rz. uz - >.. - 0•pz 
cl£- - (T - T) •w1 + E - x - p •z II: 0 {10)2:>-. 2 
Equation (6) can be rearranged as Uc• -
UN•Nc 
and implies that C is chosen so that the
 utility gained from the last 
child equals the utility lost from the r
eduction in N caused by the last 
>... w1 leads tochild. Rearranging (7) to read UN. NT• UN. N
J+ 
the following interpretation: the oppo
rtunity cost of a tmit of Tis the 
utility value of the foregone N that cou
ld have been produced if the unit 
plus the utility value of theof time had been allocated to J (UN.NJ) 
This is equated on the
foregone mney wage from a unit of J (>..-
w1). 
margin with the benefit from T, which is
 the value of N produced. For 
(7) to hold it is required that NT> NJ,
 which is plausible since Tis 
devoted entirely to producing N while J inv
olves working at the same time 
as producing N. Equation (8) implies th
at the utility gained from the 
last unit of X via the addition to N mus
t equal the utility value of the 
Equation (9) is the usual firstexpenditure on the last unit of ·x. 
order condition for a purchased good and
 equation (10) reproduces the 
combined time and budget constraints. 
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The first order conditions for the formal sector version of the 
model are identical to equations (6) - (10) with Hand WF substituted 
for J and WI, and NJ• 0. In the no-work version of the m:,del the first 
order conditions are also similar to equations (6) - (10) with (7) 
eliminated since T • T and J • O. 
In order to derive testable implications from the model a 
comparative static analysis of the effects of changes in income, wages, 
and prices on each of the endogenous variables is carried out. This is 
done by totally differentiating equations (6)-(10) and solving the 
resulting system of equations for the expressions of interest. The 
details of the analysis are contained in Appendix A to which the interested 
reader is referred for derivation of the results to be discussed here. 
The pure income effects on all variables in the model are 
ambiguous in sign. If inferior goods and factors are ruled out then the 
income effects on T, C, X and Z would be positive and the income effects 
on J and H would be negative. If N is a normal good then a positive 
income effect would be expected. But since dN/dE • NC. dC/dE + (NT-NJ)dT/dE 
+ NX. dX/dE, if the income effect on C is large relative to those for T 
and.X then dN/dE could be negative given that NC< O. The income effects on 
choice of formal sector, infot'111al sector, or no work depend upon the 
income effect on the maximum utility attninable under each of the three 
choices. These effects on utility are all clearly positive but it is 
not possible to say which is largest, so the income ef~ect on choice of 
sector is ambiguous. Given that dJ/dE and dH/dE are both negative, 
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however, one would expect this to lead eventually to a positive income 
effect on the probability of not working at all. 
The only unambiguous non-zero effects of an income-compensated 
increase in the wage offer in either sector are to decrease Tin both 
the formal and informal sector cases, and to raise Jin the informal 
sector case and raise Hin the formal sector case. These are analoRous to 
the typical substitution effect on market labor supply of a wage increase 
derived from the Slutsky equation. The sif?;IlS of the income-compensated 
wage effects on X and z·are uncertain although one would expect them to 
be positive a priori given that an increase in w
1 
or WF reduces the prices 
of X and Z relative to the price of T. The effect on the shadow price 
of C when the wage increases is uncertain so the signs of the compensated 
wage effects on fertilityare ambiguous, but might be expected to be 
negative a priori. The compensated wage effects on N are indeterminate 
because of probable offsetting effects on N of the induced increase in X 
and decrease in T. However, an increase in N may be more likely when 
w1 rises because it induces an increase in J which contributes to N, 
while an increase in WF raises H which does not contribute to N. An 
increase in the formal (informal) sector wage raises the probability 
of choosing the formal (informal) sector and reduces the probability 
of both other alternatives. This is due to the positive effect of an 
informal (formal) sector wage increase and the zero effect of a formal 
(informal) sector wage increase on maximum utility attainable in the 
informal Cforma~ sector and the zero effect of a wage increase in either 
sector on maximum utility in the no work case. 
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A compensated increase in the price of Z causes a decrease in the 
value of Zand has uncertain effects on the other choice variables in the 
model, although under further simplifying assumptions discussed in 
Appendix A the effects of an increase in Pz on C, T, and X would all be 
positive, as seems intuitively plausible. The sign of dN/dPz (compensated) 
is uncertain even with further simplifying assumptions because the 
increase in C could offset the effects of the increases in T and X. 
The 110del presented here provides few clear testable hypotheses, 
unfortunately, but this is a common problem in model_s of this type. 
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The Dldel does provide guidance for organizing and interpreting the 
empirical work, however. The two main implications of the roodel are (1) 
the demand for each of the nutrition inputs is a function of all of 
the exogenous variables in the model, and (2) nutritional status is 
itself a function of the inputs, which in turn are functions of the 
exogenous variables. Thus the income, wage, price, and household 
technology variables determine the household's decisions concerning 
time allocation, food purchases, and fertility, and the levels of 
the latter variables determine nutritional status. The next section 
discusses the empirical specification of the model and presents 
estimates of demand equations for the inputs, derived demand 
equations for nutritional status, and structural estimates of the 
nutritional status production function. 
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III. Empirical Analysis 
Description of the Data 
The data used in the study were collected in a household survey 
6
carried out in Nicaragua during 1977 and 1978. The survey took a 
stratified random sample of Nicaraguan households in which at least one 
woman between the ages of 15 and 45 years was present. One such woman 
in each household was selected as the primary respondent and a variety 
of economic, demographic, health and background information collected 
from her concerning herself and her family, including anthropometric 
nutritional status measures of at least one ~hild under five years old 
if there were any children under five. 
This study uses the subsample of spouse or companion present 
households living in cities or towns with at least one child under five 
and with complete data on all the variables used in the analysis. 
Households headed by a single, divorced, or separated woman are excluded 
because the absence of a spouse or companion (common law marriage is quite 
common in Nicaragua) probably results in a different structure to the 
relationships of interest. Agricultural and other rural households are 
excluded because the distinction between formal and informal sector 
occupations is probably not as meaningful in rural areas as in urban areas. 
The equations reported below were also estimated for the rural non­
agricultural households in the sample but the results were generally 
poor and are not reported here. Because nutritional status data were 
collected only for children under age five the sample in this study is 
restricted to households with a child under five. Finally, approximately 
14 
40 percent of the potential observations were lost due to missing data, 
mainly for nutritional status. 7 
Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for the empirical 
counterparts to the variables in the theoretical model for the sub-
8
sample used in this study. Nutritional status is measured for one 
child under age five in each family by the child's height minus the 
median height of children of the same age and sex from a well nourished 
reference population, divided by the standard deviation of height of 
children of the same age and sex in the reference population. Thus 
"Standardized Height" is measured in units of reference population 
standard deviations. This type of anthropometric measure is widely used 
as an indicator of nutritional status, designed to detect chronic mal-
9nutrition, which is known to cause stunting. Other anthropometric 
nutritional indicators such as standardized weight and bicep circumference 
were also used in the analysis but the results did not differ substantially 
from those for height, and they are not presented here. The data in Table 
1 indicate that the average child is four fifths of a standard deviation 
below his or her height norm. Since very poor child nutritional status can 
lead directly or indirectly to death, a measure of mortality among children 
born since the 1972 Managua earthquake is also used as an alternative 
10
indicator of the "output" of the household production function. 
About seven percent of families in the sample experienced a death of 
a child born since 1972. 
The variables representing inputs to the production of nutritional 
status are live births since the earthquake, months of breastfeeding, the 
woman's hours of work, food expenditure per adult equivalent, the age of 
15 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis 
Endogenous Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
Standardized Height -.80 1.57 
Deaths of Children Born 
since the 1972 Earthquate .07 .26 
Live Births Since the Earthquake 1.61 .78 
Months of breastfeeding 5.4 6.8 
Woman's Weekly hours of work 13.0 24.1 
Monthly Food Expenditure per 
Adult Equivalent -t 100a 1.54 1.11 
Age of woman at first birth 20.7 4.4 
Dummy-woman works in informal 
sectorb .20 .40 
Exogenous Variables 
Woman's years of education s.o 3.5 
Woman's age 28.1 6.5 
Dummy-woman raised in urban area .90 .30 
Biweekly family income other 
than woman's earnings -t 100 7.64 7.69 
Predicted log of woman's informal 
sector wage offerc 1.01 •35 
Predicted log of woman's formal 
sector wage offerc 1.29 .49 
Sample size 1,023 
Notes: (a) The Nicaraguan monetary unit, the cordoba, was valued at 
U.S. $.14 in 1977. All monetary variables are measured in 
cordobas or hundreds of cordobas, as indicated by the descriptions. 
(b) In this study informal sector jobs are most easily described 
as those not in the formal sector. A woman was classified in the 
formal sector if she worked as a professional, manager, administrator, 
foreman, contractor, or technical worker; or if she worked in some 
other occupation but had ten or n>re co-workers or received any 
type of social security benefit from her job (insurance, health, 
schooling for children etc.). Most of the women classified in 
the· infor11al sector worked as vendors, home craft workers, sales 
person operating in own residence, or service workers of various types. 
(c) The method used to construct the predicted log wage variables 
is deseribed in Appendix B. 
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the woman at her first birth and a dummy equal to one if the woman 
worked in an informal sector job and zero if she did not work or 
worked in a formal sector job. Fertility is measured from the time 
of the 1972 earthquake because it is expected that the more young 
children present, the lower their average nutritional status, ceteris 
paribus, while older children might contribute to the care of young 
children as well as compete with them for nutritional resources. The 
average woman (about 28 years old at the time of the survey) had one 
and three fifths live births in the 5-6 years since the earthquake. 
It should be noted that this fertility measure may not be 
closely related to a lifetime measure such as children ever born 
because birth timing probably has a strong influence on fertility over 
a five to six year span. It is also a measure of actual rather than 
desired fertility and may systematically differ from the desired birth 
pattern. This could affect the interpretation of the coefficients pre­
sented below. For example, if couples are unable to achieve as many 
births as desired due to a fecundity constraint, then the effects of 
changes in the exogenous variables on fertility reported below could 
be in part the effects of changes in these variables on the fecundity 
constraint rather than on desired fertility. 
Months of breastfeeding and hours of work measure two aspects of 
women's time allocation which affect nutritional status, and food expendi-. 
ture (given constant food prices for a cross-section at a moment of 
time) is a measure of the purchased inputs to nutrition produc.tion. 
Table 1 reveals an average of about 6 months of breastfeeding per 
child, 13 hours of work per week and 154 cordobas (about $11) of 
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food expenditure per month per adult equivalent. The age of the woman 
at the time of her first birth is included as another dimension of 
fertility for which it is important to control when investigating 
the impact of fertility on nutritional status. Finally the informal 
sector dummy is used to test the hypothesis that time spent working 
in the informal sector can also be used to produce nutrition. Twenty 
percent of the women in the sample worked in the informal sector, 
14% worked in the formal sector and the remaining 66% did not work 
at all. 
The variables shown in the lower panel of Table 1 are intended to 
represent in so far as possible the exogenous components of prices, income, 
tastes, and the state of technology faced by households. The woman's 
formal schooling is expected to affect both tastes and efficiency in 
home production, as well as her market wage offers. Age of the woman is 
included as a control for stage of the life cycle. A dummy variable for 
whether the woman was raised in an urban area may capture the effects 
of differences in prices and work opportunities between urban and 
rural areas and may also proxy for differences in tastes between urban 
and rural areas. Family 
income other than the woman's earnings includes earnings of the spouse 
or companion, earnings of older children and other adults, and transfers 
and asset income. These are all treated as exogenous with respect to 
the decisions under investigation here, although it is recognized that 
for the non-asset components of income this assumption may be question­
able. The last two variables shown in Table 1 are estimated logs of the 
wage offers faced by the woman in the informal and formal sectors, 
respectively. These are imputed from regressions of the log wage on 
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a small set of exogenous variables (education and potential experience) 
using the samples of women who reported a wage in the informal and 
formal sectors, respectively. The potential selection bias inherent in 
such a procedure is controlled for using a method developed by Hay 
(1980). The estimation method is discussed in detail and the results 
reported in Appendix B. As expected, the avera~e estimated formal 
sector wage is greater than the average estimated informal sector wa?e. 
Results 
Before discussing the empirical results several specification and 
estimation issues will be briefly mentioned. The theoretical model iave 
no reason to expect linear input demand and structural equations so 
some squared terms and interaction terms were tested. Some of these terms 
were individually significant but it was never possible to reject the 
hypothesis that as a group they were insignificant, so only the linear 
specifications are reported here. In order to estimate the woman's 
choice of sector equation the work decision is put in the form of a 
trichotomous variable indicating whether she worked in the informal 
sector, the formal sector, or did not work. Maximum likelihood trichotooous 
logit is used to estimate the equation for this variable. Maximum likeli­
hood tobit is used to estimate the length of breastfeeding and hours of 
work equations since both are limited dependent variables in the sense 
orthat substantial portions of the sa1Dfle did not breastfeed (30%) 
work (66%). All input demand equations were estimated with single 
equation techniques because they share common sets of right hand side 
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variables so even if the disturbances are correlated across 
equations no efficiency gain would result from joint estimation.
11 
However, if the disturbances of the input demand equations were 
correlated with the disturbances of the structural nutrition or 
mortality equations then the disturbances of the latter would be 
correlated with right hand side variables (the inputs) and 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) would give biased parameter estimates 
for the production functions. A more appropriate approach would 
be to use an instrumental variables procedure with the input demand 
equations providing the first stage estimates for the inputs, and 
the fitted values of the inputs used in the production function. 
However there are not enough exogenous variables in the model excluded 
from the production function to permit identification of the pro­
duction function so this is not feasible and only 01S estimates are 
possible. A check of correlations amng residuals of the input 
demand and production function equations estimated by 01S revealed 
correlation coefficients of .02 or less for the nutrition equation 
and .17 or less for the child m:>rtality equation, so 01S estimates 
of the parameters of the nutritional status production function will 
probably not be subject to simultaneous equations bias. 
The estimation results are presented in Tables 2-4, with 
t-%atios reported in parentheses next to the coefficients. The 
input demand equations are discussed first followed by the reduced 
form demand and structural nutritional status and child ucrtality 
equations. 
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Input Demand Equations 
Table 2 contains the maximum likelihood trichotomous logit 
results for choice of sector and the maximum likelihood tobit 
results for months of breastfeeding and weekly hours of work. 
Women's education appears to be the key determinant of choice 
of sector, with more educated women more likely to be in the 
formal sector and less likely to be in the informal sector. This is 
a plausible result given that the returns to education are probably 
higher in the formal sector, but it is surprising that the wage 
variables do not pick this up as well. The formal sector wage in 
particular appears to matter very little in determining choice of 
sector. This could be due in part to the high correlation between 
the wage variables LR9 due to the procedure used to estimate them 
(see Appendix B). Higher income reduces the probability of working 
in either sector, consistent with the theoretical model, though 
the coefficient estimates are insignificant. Older women are more 
likely to work in either sector and so are women who grew up in 
urban areas. 
Education has a significant negative impact on the len~th 
of breastfeeding, which may indicate that more educated women are able 
to breastfeed less without harming the nutritional status of their 
children, perhaps because education improves their knowledge of sound 
infant feeding practices. Butz and DaVanzo (1978) and Heller and Drake 
(1979) also report negative effects of the mother's education on 
breastfeeding for Malaysia and Colombia, respectively. The estimated 
income effect on breastfeeding is 
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Table 2 
Maximum Likelihood Logit and Tobit Estimation of Woman's 
Choice of Sector, Months of Breastfeeding and Hours of Work 
Trichotooous Logit Estimates Tobit Estimates of 
of Choice of Informal Sector, Months of Hours of 
Formal Sector or No Worka tBreastfeeding Work 
Informal Sector Formal Sector 
Intercept -.27 (0.7) -2 •.$2 (5.6) .63 (O .4) -111 (5. 3) 
Education -.16 (3.0) .19 (2 .8) -.86 (3. 7) 0.9 (0.4) 
Age .015 (1.1) .020 (1.1) .21 (3.2) 2.2 (3.5) 
Urban Origin .21 (1.0) .• 02 (0.1) -1.04 (1.1) 13.7 (1.6) 
Other Income -.02 (1.3) -.02 (1.2) -.08 (1.8) -0. 75 (1.6) 
Predicted Log of 
Informal Sector Wage 
Offer .33 (0.9) .28 (0.7) 1.65 (1.1) 24.4 (1.8) 
Predicted Log of Formal 
(0.1) 1.06 (0.6) -14.4 (0.9)Sector Wage Offer -.001 (O.O) .03 
2b 180 134 42 
X 
Notes: (a) The coefficients for the third choice, no work, are not 
reported here. The normalization procedure used forced the three 
coefficient vectors to sum to a zero vector across the three alter­
natives, so the coefficient vector for the no work alternative 
equals minus the sum of the coefficient.vectors for the two reported 
alternatives. 
(b) The x2 statistic reported is for a likelihood ratio test of the 
null hypothesis that all coefficients other than the intercepts are 
equal to zero for all three alternatives. The critical values for the 
x2 (12) distribution are 21, at the 5% level and 26 at the 1% level, 
and for the x2 (6) distribution, 13 and 17 respectively. 
Asymptotic t values are reported in parentheses. 
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negative and marginally significant, indicating that breastfeeding 
is viewed as an "inferior factor." Both wage effects are positive, 
though insignificant, a surprising result which is inconsistent with 
the predictions of the theoretical model. Older women breastfeed longer 
and women raised in urban areas breastfeed about one month less, other 
things equal, than women raised in rural areas. 
In the weekly hours of work equation the informal sector wage 
has the expected positive effect, marginally significant, but the 
formal sector wage again performs poorly, with an unexpected negative 
insignifican·t· coefficient. Income has a negative effect on hours of 
work, as expected, and older age and urban origin both have positive 
effects, highly significant in the case of age. The education effect 
is positive but insignificant, indicating no marked effect of education 
on the relative productivity of time at home versus market time. 
The estimation results for the three remaining input demand 
equations are presented in Table 3. The fertility equation shows an 
unexpected positive and significant effect of education on live births 
since the earthquake. This is an unusual finding but may be due to 
the relatively short period over which fertility is being measured. 
More educated women may bunch births more closely together in order 
to reduce time lost from market work, but still have lower completed 
fertility. Also, when the effect of education on the wage offers is 
taken into account the total effect of education 
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Table 3 
Linear Regression Estimates of Equations for Live Births 
Since the Earthquake, Woman's Age at First Birth, and Food 
Expenditures per Adult Equivalent 
Live Births A~e at First Birtt.~ood Expenditures 
.78 (3.9)Intercept 2.1 (14.8) 8.3 (12.4) 
.06 (2.0)Education .07 (3.6) .04 ( 0 .4) 
Age .01 (1.1) .35 (13.4) -.002 (0. 3) 
.05 (O .5)Urban Origin .02 (0 .2) _ .... 33 ( 0.9) 
-.04 ( 2.3) .02 (3.0)Other Income .005 (1.3) 
Predicted log of Informal 
Sector Wage Offer -.03 (0.2) .44 ( 0.8) .4 7 (2. 8) 
Predicted Log of Formal 
1.94 ( 2.9) -.08 (0.4)Sector Wage Offer -.85 (5.8) 
R2 (F) .07 (12.7) . 36 (96. 9) .11 (21
.2) 
T statistics are in parentheses. 
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on fertility becomes negative (see Table 5). The formal 
sector wage offer has a significant negative coefficient in the 
fertility equation, which is consistent with, though not pre­
dicted by, the theoretical model. Income has a small positive 
effect but the coefficient estimate is insignificant, as are the 
remaining coefficient estimates in the fertility equation. 
The coefficient estimates in the age at first birth 
equation show that higher wage offers, particularly in the formal 
sector cauae women to have their first birth at a later age, while 
higher other income tends to lower the age at first birth. The 
strong age effect simply indicates that current age is a ceiling 
on age at first birth. The positive education and negative urban 
origin coefficients are both insignificant. 
Education, income and informal sector wages all have 
positive significant coefficient estimates in the food expenditure 
per adult equivalent equation, while the age, urban origin, and 
formal sector wage coefficients are insignificant. 
Nutritional Status and Child Mortalitv Equations 
Table 4 presents coefficient estimates of both reduced form 
demand and structural equations for nutritional status and child 
mortality since the earthquake. The 100st striking results in the 
nutritional status demand equation are the positive significant 
wage coefficients, particularly strong for the formal sector wage. 
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Table 4 
Linear Regression Estimates of Reduced Form and 
Structural Nutritional Status and Child Mortility Equations 
A.Reduced Form Equations 
\Standardized Hei~ht Child Mortality 
Intercept -1.14 (3.9) .22 (4 .1) 
Education - .05 (1. 3) .008 (1.0) 
Age - .04 (3.4) .0004 ( .18) 
Urban Origin .12 (0.7)_. -.04 (1.2) 
Other Income -.006 (O .8) .0009 (0.6) 
Predicted Log of 
Informal Sector Wage Offer .43 (1.7) -.001 (O .0) 
Predicted Log of Formal 
Sector Wage Offer .92 (3.1) -.13 (2.4) 
R2 (F) .07 (12 .O) .02 (3.7) 
B. Production Function Estimates 
!Standardized Hei ht Child Mortalit 
-.09 (1.8)Intercept fl.02 (3.6) 
' 
Education (5.7) -.003 (1.1)I .09 
Months of Breastfeeding -.02 (2.3) -.00005 (0.0) 
Hours of Work -.002 (0.9) .00005 (1.1) 
(3.6) .12 (11.6)Live Births Since Eq. -.22 
(O. 7) -.006 (0. 7)Food Expenditure per A.E. -.03 
Age at First Birth .01 (1.3) .001 (0.7) 
.03 (O .2) .01 (0.6)Informal Sector
a 
R2 (F) .07 (10.9) .13 (21.9) 
Notes: (a) The informal eector is a dichotomous variable here, rather 
than the trichotomous variable used in Table 2. 
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An increase in the woman's value of time reduces the relative price 
of purchased market inputs and raises the price of home time, and if
 
market inputs are substantially more productive than home time this 
could explain why wage increases lend to nutritional status improve­
ments. The wage increase also tends to reduce fertility and given 
the hypothesized negative fertility effect on nutrition this is 
another channel through which the positive wage effect on nutrition 
could arise. Education and income both have unexpected negative 
insignificant effects on nutritional status, and age of the woman 
has a negative· significant coefficient estimate. The signs of the 
coefficients in the child mortality equation are all opposite of 
the corresponding signs in the nutrition equation, as expected, 
but only the formal sector wage coefficient is significant. 
The nutritional status production function estimates reveal 
Fertilitysome interesting and in some cases surprising results. 
has its hypothesized negative effect on nutritional status and 
the coefficient estimate is highly significant. Education has a 
highly significant positive coefficient estimate indicating that 
the effect of education on the woman's home productivity is positive
, 
so the negative education coefficient in the upper panel of Table 
4 must arise from some other source. Months of breastfeeding has 
an unexpected negative and significant effect on nutritional status 
and the food expenditure effect is also unexpectedly negative, 
A possible explanation for the breastfeedingthough insignificant. 
result is that women who breastfeed longer than average may also not 
provide supplementary food to their infants as early as necessary 
27 
(4-6 months after birth). The breastfeeding coefficient would then 
pick up the harmful effect on nutritional status of lack of sup­
plementary feeding even though breastfeeding itself is not harmful. 
The lack of a significant effect of food expenditures may indicate that 
this variable is not a good proxy for a child-specific food consumption 
variable, which is not available in thi.s data. Hours of work has only 
a small negative effect on child nutrition and age at first birth 
has a small positive effect. The coefficient on the informal sector 
dwmny does not reveal a strong effect on nutritional status of being 
in the informal sector. In the child mortality equation the only 
significant coefficient estimate is for fertility and this is due in 
large part to the fact that women with more births have more 
children at risk of mortality. 
IV. Conclusions 
The key results are summarized in Table 5 in elasticity 
form (except for nutritional status-see note (e) in Table 5). 
With the exceptions noted above, most of the empirical results are 
consistent with the predictions and asstnnptions of the theoretical 
model discussed in Section II. 
The results in Table 5 suggest that increasing levels of 
women's education will draw women in developing countries out of 
the informal sector and into the formal sector, and will cause 
declines in both fertility and mrtality and improvements in child 
Table 5 
Elasticities of the Endogenous Variables with Respect 








Probability of Informal 
Sector Participationc -.65** -.07 -. 38 .79 .02 
Probability of Formal 
Sector Participation 1.66 -.38 • 74 .OS 
dMonths of Breastfeeding -.53** -. 31. -.08* .20 .13 
Hours of Work .10 .13 .56* -.33 
Live Births Since EQ. .22** -.12** .02 -.')2 -.53** 
Age at First Birth .08 .02 .09** 
Food Expenditure per A.E. .19** • 37** .10** • 30** -.05 
Nutritional Statuse -.02 .42 -.00 .21* .46** 
Child Mortality .57 -.59 .10 -.01 -1.86** 
Notes: *: Coefficient estimate si~nificant at the 10% level. 
**: Coefficient estimate significant at the 5% level. 
(a): The elasticities are calculated at the means of the variables. 
(b): The elasticities in this colurrm incorporate the effect of education 
on wages. From Table B-2 in the Appendix the elasticities of the informal and 
formal sector wages with respect to education are .72 and .62, respectively, 
as weighted averages of the Managua and other urban elasticities. 
(c) The elasticities from the logit equations use the following formula 
for the partial derivative of the predicted probability of alternative j with 
respect to variable i: 
3 
P(j) • [b - ! P{j) • bji] 
ji j•l 
where bji • estimated coefficient on variable i for alternative j, and the P(j) 
are calculated at the means. 
(d) The elasticities for the tobit equations use the following formula 
for the partial derivative of the endogenous variable with respect to variable i: 
bi. F(Z) 
3 
a• estimated standarwhere bi is the coefficient on variable i, Z ! P{j).bji], 
a j•l 
error of the residuals, X • the jth exogenous variable, and F(.) is the cumulative 
distribution function of j the standard normal variate. 
(e) Elasticities for nutritional status could not be calculated because 
of the nature of the standardized height variable, which could have a mean of 
zero. The numbers reported here are the effects of 10% increases in the 
exogenous variables on standardized height, so they are measured in units of 
standard deviations of height. 
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nutritional status. Increases in formal sector wages will have 
similar effects on fertility, mortality, and nutrition, but apparently 
will not draw women into the formal sector. These results tend to 
substantiate the views of those who advocate promoting the expansion 
of formal sector jobs for women as a means of hastening the decline 
of fertility rates in developing countries. The improvement in 
nutrition and decrease in mortality of children which would 
apparently accompany the fertility decline provide an even stronger 
rational for such a policy. 
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Appendix A 
Comparative Static Results 
This Appendix presents a comparative static analysis of 
the model presented in the text. The analysis is carried out 
for the informal sector version of the model and it is then 
shown how the results are modified for the formal sector version 
and the no work version. The separability assumption regarding 
the utility function made in the text is maintained here, so 
it is assumed that UCZ • UNZ • O. Interior solutions are assumed 
throughout the analysis. 
In the informal sector version of the model the household 
maximizes the Lagrangean 
£ - U(N[T, T - T, X, C), C, Z) 
The first order conditions for a maximum given in the text 
are repeated here: 
a£ - • U .N + U • 0 (Al)ac N C C 
(A2) 





Totally differentiating these five equations and rearranging the 
results leads to the following matrix equation: 
dC 0 a b C 0 0 
dT ).•dw
b d e 0 -w I I 
(A6)dX 0•
C e f 0 -1 -
dZ ).•dP
0 0 0 -P zuzz z 
d). -dE - J•dW + Z•dPI Z 
0 -w -1 -P 0I z 
where 
b • UN(NTC - NJC) + (NT - NJ) (UNNNC + UCN) ~ 0 
C - UNNCX + Nx(U~c + UCN): 0 
> 
< 0 
The second order conditions for a maximum require that a< O, 
(b- c•w ) 2 , and D >O, where Dis the determinant1 
of the bordered Hessian matrix in A6. These conditions will 
be assumed to hold. By using Cramer's rule to solve equation A6 
.and allowing one exogenous variable at a time to vary the follow­
ing comparative static derivatives can be derived: 
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dC/dE • - 0





I _• 1 
D 
• A • 
U=U 
dC/dP I _•.!.•A • P (-b•(f •w - e) - c(d - e·w1) >Z U=U D Z I < 0 
dT/dw1 1 _ • 
- f> • A •(Pi•(a •f - c 2) + a• u22) < O 
. . lJ=U 
dt/-i~ ·I - "" .!. • A p .(a(f.wI -e)-c•(c •wI - b)) .$, 0~-Z U=U D • Z 
1
il./dE -= D 





dX/dPzl _ .. 
U=U 
2 >







1 _ -- .
U=U D 
None of the income effects can be signed with certainty 
but in the absence of any inferior goods or factors they would all 
be presumed positive. The signs of the compensated wage and price 
effects are tmcertain with the exception of the own price effects 
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(dT/dwI U•U and dZ/dP2 U•U) which are both negative. In order to derive 
stronger predictions one must impose more structure on the model. For 
example, one strong assumption would be that the production ftmction is 
strongly separable, i.e. all cross partial derivatives of N(·) with 
respect to the inputs are equal to zero. Under this assumption the terms 
a, ... , f become simpler and one can show that b>O, c>O, e<O, and the first 
order conditions imply that b - c•wr = 0. This would lead to the 
following predictions: dC/dPzlU=U>O, dT/dP2 jU=U>O, dX/dP2l U=U>O, and 
dZ/dwII U=U>O, with the other two wage effects still uncertain. 
To find the effects of changes in E, ·wI, and Pz on N, the production 
function is differentiated with respect to these variables. Thus 
dN/dE • (NT-NJ) •d'D'dE + NX~dX/dE + Nc·dC/dE cannot be signed 
even if all income effects were positive since NC< O. 
The signs of dN/dwrluzU and dN/dPzlu=u are also tmcertain even under 
the strong separability assumption on the production function. This is 
due to uncertainty about the direction of the effects of wI on C and X, 
and to the offsetting effects on N of the increases in T, X, and C 
induced by a compensated increase in P •2 
The comparative static results for the formal sector a,del 
are identical to those for the informal sector model with wF and H 
substituted for wI and J, and NJ• NJJ • NJC • NJX • O. In the 
no-work version of the model T • T and H • J • 0 and the only 
decisions are bow to allocate income between X and Zand where 
on the N-C tradeoff locus to be. Changes in w and wF h&V£ no1 
effect at all in this case, the compensated PZ effects-are all 
similar to the informal sector case, and the income effects are still 
uncertain in sign unless inferior goods and factors are ruled out. 
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Appendix B 
Wage Estimation Procedure 
In this Appendix the procedure used to obtain estimates of the informal 
and formal sector market wage offers facing all women in the sample is described. 
If women who work differ systematically from non-working women in some unmeasured 
characteristics then selectivity bias could result from imputing wages for 
all women based on regressions using the working subsample. This problem 
has a commonly used solution (Heckman 1976) but an added twist is introduced 
by the need to obtain predictions for all women of separate market wage 
offers for the two sectors. Separate wage regressions for informal sector 
workers and formal sector workers are required but rather than the usual 
dichotomous selection problem (in or out of the labor force) there is a 
trichotomous selection problem (informal sector, formal sector or out of 
the labor force). 
A selectivity correction procedure developed by Hay (1980) is ideally 
suited to this problem. The mechanics of the procedure and the results are 
given below, and the reader is referred to Hay's paper for a detailed 
derivation of the procedure, and to Heckman (1976) for a general discussion 
of selectivity bias. 
The first step of the procedure involves running maximum likelihood 
trichotomus logit on the informal-formal-no work trichotomy with a small 
set of exogenous right hand side variables which enter either a market 
wage offer function or a home value of time function. The variables used 
here include the woman's education, potential years of work experience (age 
minus education minus five), experience squared and family income other 
than her earnings. The results, shown in Table B-1, are given for Managua 
and other urban area separately although in the text the two urban areas 
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Table B-1 
Maximum Likelihood Trichotomous Logit Estimation
of the Informal Sector, Formal Sector, No Work Choicea 
Mana ua Other UrbanInformal Sector 
Intercept -2.04 (7. 78) -2.46 (7. 95) 
Education .25 (12. 93) .21 (10.86) 
Experience .026 (1.15) .065 (2.49) 
Experience Squared -.017 ( .32) -.083 (1.35) 
Biweekly Family Income
Other than Woman's
Earnings -t 100 -.0051 (.70) -.0076 (. 97) 
Formal Sector 
Intercept .78 (3.07) • 68 (.:: .43) 
Education -.14 (7.96) -.09 (5.12) 
Experience .015 (.67) -.024 (.99) 
Experience Squared -.034 (.68) (.069) (1.30) 
Biweekly Family Income
Other than Woman's
Earnings+ 100 -.0519 (5.54) -.0257 (2.84) 
Sample Size 1,638 1,291 
Log,of likelihood Function -1,528 -1,181 
Notes: (a) The coefficients are normalized such that the coefficient vectorsfor the three alternatives sum to a zero vector. The coefficient vectorfor the no work alternative, -not shown here, equals minus the sum of thecoefficient vectors for the two other alternatives 
3E, 
are always run together. The reason for this is to impose as few cons­
traints as possible on the wage prediction procedure. Also note 
that the samples used here are larger than those used in the text: they 
include all observations with non-missing values of the few variables used 
here, rather than only observations with non-missing values for all variables 
used-in the analysis in the text. The reason again is to use the maximum 
information possible. 
The next step is to use the results from Table B-1 to construct variables 
which are inserted in wage regressions to serve as controls for the selection 
bias arising from the wage imputation procedure. The formula for the informal 
sector selection bias control variable which is derived in Hay (1980), is 
where PN s predicted probability of not working, PF• predicted probability 
of working in the formal sector, and PI• predicted probability of working 
in the informal sector. The formula for a typical one of these predicted 
probabilities, Pi' is given by 
where~ is the vector of coefficients for alternative i, Xis the vector 
of right hand side variables, and~ is the coefficient vector for alterna­
tive j, j • no work, formal sector, informal sector. The formula for the 
formal sector selection bias control variable, lF, is the same as for AI 
17 
with the F and I subscripts in the formula switched. 
Finally, for each sector and region a regression of the log of the 
woman's hourly wage was run on education, potential experience, experience 
squared, and the selection bias control variable AI er AF. The results 
are shown in Table B-2 along with similar regressions without the A's 
for comparison. These results do not always accord with one's prior 
notions concerning relative magnitudes of coefficients in different sectors 
and regions, particularly when the A terms are included. For example, 
one would expect a higher rate of return to education in the formal sector 
and the results generally confirm this except for the case of Managua when 
the A terms are included. The A's are significant at the 5% level in one 
out of four cases,and in some cases the omission of A yields drastically 
different coefficient estimates for the remaining variables, particularly 
in the informal sector equations. In the absence of any strong indication 
that selection bias is or is not important in this sample, an arbitrary 




Linear Regression Estimates of the Log of 
The Woman's Hourly Wage by Sector and Region 
ManaJua Other Urban 
Informal Sector 
Intercept -3.41 (1. 98) -.79 (1.97) 1.59 (1.18) i-.07 ( .18) 
Education .29 (2 .42) .11 (4 .59) .01 ( .09) .09 (3.85) 
Experience .14 (3.88) .12 (3.55) .04 (.96) .06 (1.90) 
2Experience -.24 (3.23) -.23 (3.08) -.11 (1.49) -.14 (2.02) 
AJ -1.50 (1.57) .86 (1.30) 
R2 (F) .10 (7 .6) .10 (9.2) .12 (7 .4) .12 (9. 3) 
n 267 267 217 217 
Formal Sector 
Intercept .16 (.73) .17 (.73) -.38 (1.03) -.16 ( .4 7) 
Education .10 (5.26) .15 (10.31) .16 (6.79) .18 (9.58) 
Experience .03 (1.46) .02 (1.36) .002 (.08) .008 ( .26) 
2Experience -.01 (.25) .01 ( .13) .08 (1.15) .07 (.94) 
AF -.42 (3.90) -.45 (1.48) 
R2 (F) .34 (33.5) .30 (37.6) .37(25.5) .37 (33.1) 
n 271 271 176 176 
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Notes 
1see Blau (1980, Chapter 1) for a review of evidence on the harmfuleffects of malnutrition on children and the extent of malnutrition in develop­ing countries. 
2The household production model owes its original formulation toBecker (1965) and was developed more intensively and applied to fertilitydecisions by Willis (1974). The model has now been used frequantly indeveloping country contexts; see, for example, Rbsenzweig and Wolpin (1980). 
3see Blau(l980, Chapter 4) for discussion of a more fully specifiedmodel. 
4Cogan (1977) found that fixed money and time costs of working amountedto about one quarter of the average annual earnings of women in a U.S. sample. 
5See Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) for a discussion of the types of.restrictions that must be imposed on the household production model in orderto derive more testable hypotheses. 
6The survey was funded by the Population and Development Policy ResearchProgram of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and the Agency for Interna­tional Development. The principal investigators for the overall projectof which the survey is a part are Jere R. Behrman (University of Pennsylvania),Barbara L. Wolfe {University of Wisconsin-Madison), Humberto Belli (Centrode Investigaciones Sociales Nicaraguense) and Antonio Ibarra (Banco Centralde Nicaragua). 
7It is unknown to what extent the data are randomly missing. SeeBehrman, Flesher and Wolfe (1979) and Behrman and Wolfe (1980) for furtherdiscussion of this issue as it pertains to the Nicaragua data. 
8See Behrman, Wolfe and Gustafson (1980) for a description of thecharacteristics of the whole sample. 
9The reference population used in this study is that of the UnitedStates (see National Center for Health Statistics 1976). Habicht et al.(1974) discuss the appropriateness of using norms from developed countriesas a standard for use in developing countries. 
10See Pan American Health Organization (1973) for evidence on therelationship between malnutrition and infant and child mortality in LatinAmerica. Mortality of children born after the Managua earthquake of 1972is used because of the unusually high mortality among children living in1972 caused by the earthquake. 
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